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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
These consolidated cases present the question whether a 
federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate challenges to changes to a collective bar gaining 
agreement, made in connection with a rail mer ger 
authorized by the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The 
District Court and the STB concluded that the latter has 
exclusive authority to resolve labor disputes arising out of 
STB-approved rail consolidations. For the r easons set out 
below, we will affirm the decision of the District Court and 
deny the petition for review of the decision of the STB. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 
In 1988, Transtar, Inc., a transportation holding 
company located in Monroeville, Pennsylvania, acquired 
control of the Union Railroad Company and the Bessemer 
and Lake Erie Railroad Company, along withfive other rail 
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carriers and one water carrier. This consolidation was 
achieved pursuant to an Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) authorization (Control Order), which, under 49 U.S.C. 
S 10505, exempted the transaction from the prior approval 
requirements of 49 U.S.C. SS 10746, 11321, and 11343.1 
Blackstone Capital Partners, L.P., and USX Corporation -- 
Exemption from 49 U.S.C. 10746, 11321 and 11343, 
Finance Docket No. 31363, served Dec. 23, 1988. The ICC 
found that exempting the transaction would "minimiz[e] 
administrative expense" and "foster sound economic 
conditions and encourage efficient management." Id. slip 
op. at 2. When the ICC authorized a merger , it was required 
by 49 U.S.C. S 11326 to impose labor pr otections for 
affected employees. Here, the ICC complied with S 11326 by 
applying the New York Dock employee protective conditions. 
 
The New York Dock conditions ar e those adopted in New 
York Dock Ry. - Control - Br ooklyn Eastern District 
Terminal, 360 I.C.C. 60, 84 (1979), aff 'd. sub. nom. New 
York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F .2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979). 
Under New York Dock, changes r elated to authorized 
transactions are accomplished through implementing 
agreements negotiated between the rail carrier and 
representatives of the employees. If the parties cannot agree 
to the terms and conditions of the implementing agreement, 
either party may unilaterally invoke an arbitration 
proceeding to resolve the dispute.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803, 
abolished the ICC (S 101, 109 Stat. at 804) and transferred its remaining 
functions to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) effective January 1, 
1996. The Act also resulted in the renumbering of various provisions of 
the ICA. Following are the former section numbers that are relevant here 
with the new numbers in brackets: S 10505[S 10502]; S 11341 [S 11321]; 
S 11347 [S 11326]. The new pr ovisions were re-enacted without 
substantive change. In referring to the statute in this opinion, we will 
employ the current section numbering. 
 
2. More specifically, the New York Dock conditions provide compensatory 
benefits to employees who are adversely af fected by a railroad merger or 
control transaction, including protecting affected employees' wages for 
up to six years. The New York Dock conditions also fix procedures for 
making adjustments in workforces and labor agr eements that will permit 
carriers to implement an authorized transaction. Article I, S 4 requires a 
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Prior to the 1988 consolidation, the Union Railr oad 
Company and the Bessemer and Lake Erie Railr oad 
Company (collectively, the Railroad) had maintained 
separate accounting departments. The workers in each of 
these departments worked solely for their respective 
carriers and under separate collective bargaining 
agreements. The clerical workers employed by Union 
Railroad were members of the United Steelworkers of 
America (USWA); the clerical workers of Bessemer and Lake 
Erie were members of the Transportation Communications 
International Union. 
 
As part of the implementation of the 1988 Contr ol Order, 
the Railroad sought to coordinate certain clerical work by 
moving Union Railroad's accounting department to 
Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad. As requir ed by Article 1, 
S 4, of the New York Dock conditions, the Railroad notified 
the unions of its proposed coordination in a letter dated 
September 3, 1996. The notice stated that nine new 
positions would be established at Bessemer and Lake Erie 
Railroad to perform the consolidated work; nine positions 
at Union Railroad would thereby be eliminated. The notice 
also explained that the nine former Union Railroad 
employees would be incorporated into the existing 
Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad clerical seniority roster 
according to their Union Railroad seniority rank. 
 
The USWA, the Union Railroad clerical union, claimed 
that the proposed coordination of work would violate a 
scope rule contained in the United Railroad/USW A's 
collective bargaining agreement, which forbade non-Union 
Railroad employees from perfor ming its accounting work.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
carrier to give affected employees ninety days' advance notice of a 
proposed transaction. The parties must begin negotiation of an 
implementing agreement within ten days of the notice; after thirty days, 
either party may submit the dispute to arbitration before an arbitrator 
acting pursuant to STB authority. If the parties ar e unable to select an 
arbitrator within five days, they may ask the National Mediation Board 
to appoint one. The arbitration hearing must begin within twenty days of 
the arbitrator's designation and the decision is to be rendered within 
thirty days of the hearing. 360 I.C.C. at 84, 85. 
 
3. The scope rule provided: "[If][a]ny person outside the bargaining unit 
or any person not covered by the bargaining unit performs work in 
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The USWA maintained that changes to the scope rule must 
be made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 
U.S.C. SS 151 et seq. The USW A also argued that it was not 
a party to any other agreement, such as the W ashington 
Job Protection Agreement of 1936,4 that would authorize 
the contemplated changes. Accordingly, the USW A asserted 
that it considered the Railroad's letter of September 3, 
1996, detailing the planned coordination, as a notice of 
proposed changes in the collective bargaining agreement 
under S 6 of the RLA. 
 
On October 26, 1996, the Railroad responded by 
providing formal notice that it was invoking arbitration 
under Article I, S 4, of New York Dock. The USWA countered 
in a letter dated November 1, 1996, that it could not be 
compelled to arbitrate because the RLA allows changes to 
existing collective bargaining agreements only if the 
changes are arbitrated with the mutual consent of both 
parties. 45 U.S.C. S 157. It would ther efore consider the 
Railroad's invocation of arbitration under New York Dock as 
a termination of voluntary negotiations underS 6 of the 
RLA. The USWA further asserted that it would not aid in 
the selection of a New York Dock arbitrator. The Railroad 
subsequently requested the National Mediation Board 
(NMB) to appoint a neutral referee to arbitrate the dispute. 
The NMB appointed Arbitrator Witt. 
 
On October 29, 1996, the USWA served the Railroad with 
an RLA S 6 bargaining proposal, asking for numerous 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
violation of this section and the employee who otherwise would have 
performed this work can reasonably be identified, the Company shall 
pay such employee the applicable standard hourly rate for the time 
involved or for four (4) hours, whichever is gr eater." This rule was 
first 
adopted in 1978 and subsequently revised in 1981. 
 
4. The Washington Job Protection Agr eement was signed by many of the 
nation's rail carriers and unions in 1936. It r equired carriers to 
compensate employees dismissed or displaced as a r esult of railroad 
mergers and to pay relocating costs. It also provided that carriers give 
notice of consolidation to employees and to negotiate implementing 
agreements for coordinating workfor ces. Disputes concerning the 
interpretation of agreements were submitted to binding arbitration. See 
New York Dock, 609 F. at 87. 
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changes to the collective bargaining agr eement. The 
Railroad responded by filing this action, seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief under the Declaratory Judgement Act, 
28 U.S.C. S 2001, and the RLA, 45 U.S.C. S 151. The 
Railroad sought a declaration that the USW A's October 29, 
1996, S 6 notice was premature because of a moratorium 
clause in the existing collective bargaining agreement and 
that self-help was not available. 
 
The USWA filed its counterclaim on December 9, 1996, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pr eventing the 
Railroad from carrying out its proposed coordination of 
clerical workers through the New York Dock arbitration 
procedure. Compelled arbitration of the dispute under this 
procedure, the USWA claimed, would violate its rights 
under the RLA. The USWA next filed a motion for summary 
judgment, with respect to both the Railr oad's claim and its 
counterclaim. The Railroad, in tur n, filed a motion to 
dismiss the counterclaim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
On November 24, 1997, the District Court found, inter 
alia, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
USWA's counterclaim: "A review of the relevant case law 
persuades me that the propriety of the Railr oad's invocation 
of the New York Dock process must be resolved by the STB, 
and by the Court of Appeals. I do not have jurisdiction over 
these matters." Union Railroad Company v. United 
Steelworkers of America, No. 96-2095, slip op. at 8 (WDPA, 
Nov. 1997). The USWA timely appealed the District Court's 
November 23, 1997, dismissal.5 
 
While the action was pending in the District Court, the 
New York Dock arbitration proceeded, with the USWA 
preserving its objections to the arbitrator's jurisdiction. On 
October 21, 1997, Arbitrator Witt issued her award (Witt 
Award), which imposed, with a few modifications, the 
implementing agreement that the Railroad had proposed. 
On November 10, 1997, the USWA petitioned the STB for 
an administrative review of the Witt A ward, pursuant to 49 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court has also granted USW A's motion for summary 
judgment on the complaint, making the order appealed from a final 
order. 
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C.F.R. S 1115.8. By a decision dated December 16, 1998, 
the STB declined review of the Witt A ward. Union Railroad 
Company and Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad- 
Arbitration Review - United Steel Workers of America, STB 
Finance Docket No. 31363 (Sub-No. 3), served Dec, 16, 
1998. The USWA filed a timely petition for review of the 
STB decision. 
 
II. Jurisdiction 
 
The District Court dismissed the USWA's counterclaim 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to review thefinal judgment of the 
District Court. 
 
The STB had jurisdiction over the USWA's petition to 
review the arbitral decision under 49 U.S.C.SS 10502, 
11323, and 11326. Our jurisdiction over the USW A's 
petition to review the STB's decision is based on 28 U.S.C. 
SS 2321(a), 2342(5), and 2344. 
 
III. Standard of Review 
 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
dismissal of the USWA's counterclaim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See Erienet, Inc. v. V elocity Net, Inc., 
156 F.3d 513, 514 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
We may not upset the decision of the STB unless we find 
that it is arbitrary, capricious, or in excess of its statutory 
authority. See National Small Shipments T raffic Conference, 
Inc., v. United States, 887 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
A. The District Court Decision 
 
The jurisdictional question at issue here--whether the 
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the USWA's challenge to the Railroad's implementation of 
its 1988 ICC-authorized consolidation--requir es us to 
examine the relationship between the Railr oad Labor Act 
and the Interstate Commerce Act. The USW A argues that 
the RLA and the ICA are "co-equal" and complementary 
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statutory schemes and that, therefore, the District Court 
had general federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1331 to hear its counterclaim seeking 
enforcement of its rights under the RLA. The Railroad 
contends that the ICA is the exclusive statutory scheme for 
dealing with railroad consolidations and that accordingly 
the STB has exclusive jurisdiction to consider disputes 
concerning changes to labor agreements which are 
necessary to implement an STB-authorized consolidation. 
We agree with the Railroad. 
 
The RLA was passed in 1926 to encourage collective 
bargaining between railroads and their employees, thereby 
preventing strikes and interruptions to interstate 
commerce. See Detroit and Toledo Shore Line Railroad Co. v. 
United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148 (1969). To 
this end, the RLA establishes elaborate procedures for the 
negotiation, enforcement, and modification of collective 
bargaining agreements between railr oad carriers and 
railroad labor unions. The RLA also imposes upon parties 
the obligation to engage in good-faith negotiations and to 
maintain status quo without resorting to self-help while the 
RLA's remedies are being exhausted. The exhaustion of the 
RLA's remedies is, however, "an almost interminable 
process." Id. at 149. "[T]he procedures of the Act are 
purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that 
reason and practical considerations will pr ovide in time an 
agreement that resolves the dispute." Brotherhood of Ry. & 
Steamship Clerks, etc. v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. , 384 
U.S. 238, 246 (1966). 
 
The ICA, on the other hand, gives substance to what has 
been, since the adoption of the Transportation Act of 1920, 
the nation's policy of pursuing railroad carrier consolidation 
as a means of promoting the health and efficiency of the 
railroad industry: "[C]onsolidation of the railroads of the 
country, in the interest of economy and efficiency, became 
an established national policy . . . so intimately r elated to 
the maintenance of an adequate and efficient rail 
transportation system that the `public inter est' in the one 
cannot be disassociated from that in the other ." United 
States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 232 (1939); see also, St. 
Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 347 U.S. 298, 
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315-321 (1954). The ICA grants the STB exclusive authority 
to approve mergers and acquisitions of transportation 
carriers within its jurisdiction. 49 U.S.C. S 11323(a). It also 
provides that STB-authorized consolidations ar e exempted 
from "the antitrust laws and from all other law, including 
State and municipal law, as necessary to let that rail 
carrier . . . carry out the transaction." 49 U.S.C. S 11341(a).6 
The authorization may take one of two forms. The STB 
may, under 49 U.S.C. SS 11323-11324, affir matively 
approve a merger, acquisition of control, or other rail 
consolidation by determining that it is "consistent with the 
public interest." U.S.C. S 11324(c). Alternatively, 49 U.S.C. 
S 10505 allows the STB to authorize a consolidation by 
granting an exemption for the prior approval r equirements 
of SS 11323-11324.7 In either case, the STB is required to 
impose labor protective measures for af fected employees as 
a condition of consolidation authorizations. 49 U.S.C. 
S 11326. 
 
Our analysis of the relationship between the RLA and the 
ICA begins with the most recent Supreme Court decision on 
the subject, Norfolk and Wester n Ry. Co. v. American Train 
Dispatchers' Ass'n., 499 U.S. 117, 132 (1991). There, labor 
unions in two separate cases challenged ICC or ders that 
relieved the railroad carriers from collective bargaining 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. 49 U.S.C. S 11321(a) provides: 
 
        The authority of the Board under this subchapter is exclusive. A 
       rail carrier or corporation participating in or r esulting from a 
       transaction approved by or exempted by the Boar d under this 
       subchapter may carry out the transaction, own and operate 
       property, and exercise control or franchises acquired through the 
       transaction without the approval of a State authority. A rail 
carrier, 
       corporation, or person participating in that appr oved or exempted 
       transaction is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other 
       law, including State and municipal law, as necessary to let that 
rail 
       carrier, corporation, or person carry out the transaction, hold, 
       maintain, and operate property, and exer cise control or franchises 
       acquired through the transaction. 
 
7. Exemption from the full approval pr ocess is appropriate when "the 
transaction or service is of limited scope" or when "the application in 
whole or in part of the provision is not needed to protect shippers from 
the abuse of market power." 49 U.S.C.S 10505. 
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agreement obligations. The unions argued that S 11321(a), 
which confers to transactions necessary for the 
implementation of ICC-authorized consolidations immunity 
from "all other law," does not abr ogate existing collective 
bargaining agreements. Modification of such agreements, 
the unions insisted, must be made pursuant to the RLA. 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed: "RLA is a law that, under 
[S 11321(a)], is superseded when an ICC-approved 
transaction requires abrogation of collective-bargaining 
obligations." Id. at 132 (citations omitted). This conclusion, 
the Supreme Court explained, is consistent with the ICA's 
overall statutory scheme. The ICA was designed to pr omote 
"economy and efficiency in interstate transportation by the 
removal of the burdens of excessive expenditure." Texas v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 522, 534-35 (1934). Recognizing 
that consolidations of carriers would result in employee 
dismissals, transfers and other changes detrimental to 
employees, the ICA mandated that the ICC impose 
safeguards, like the New York Dock  employee protective 
conditions, to ensure that employee inter ests of the affected 
parties are protected. Section 11321(a), in turn, guaranteed 
that, once these interests are accounted for, the ICC would 
be free from requirements, such as provisions of the RLA, 
that might impede the consolidation. If the RLA wer e not 
superseded by the ICA, the Court observed, "rail carrier 
consolidations would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve," because "[t]he resolution process for major 
disputes under the RLA would so delay the pr oposed 
transfer of operations that any efficiencies the carriers 
sought would be defeated." Dispatchers, 499 U.S. at 133 
(citations omitted).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Union argues, based in part on our decision in Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania & Lake Erie Railr oad Co., 845 F.2d 
420 (3d. Cir. 1988), that the RLA and the ICA are co-equal and 
complementary sources of legal rights. In that case, we focused on the 
differing policy goals animating the RLA and the ICA. The former, we 
stated, advances the policy of avoiding "disruptions in the railroad 
industry by promoting collective bargaining and preventing strikes." Id. 
at 436. The latter promoted the policy goal of"encourag[ing] the flow of 
capital into the [rail] industry" and "expedit[ing] the approval process 
so 
that efficient transactions are not derailed by red tape." Id. In light of 
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Although Dispatchers did not directly address the 
jurisdictional question at issue here, the Ninth and Fourth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have interpreted Dispatchers, and 
the relationship between the RLA and the ICA that it 
envisions, as compelling the conclusion that the ICC (now 
the STB), not the district court, has the exclusive authority 
to resolve labor disputes that arise fr om implementing an 
ICC (or STB)-authorized transaction. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n. v. Southern Pacific T ransportation Co., 7 
F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 1993); Nor folk & Western Ry. v. 
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, 164 F.3d 847 (4th Cir. 
1998). 
 
In Southern Pacific, the ICC appr oved a merger of certain 
railroads pursuant to 49 U.S.C. S 11321(a) and, in 
compliance with 49 U.S.C. S 11326, imposed the New York 
Dock conditions to protect existing and future employees 
from the adverse effects of the mer ger. When time came for 
the merged railroad to coordinate work, it claimed, believing 
that the coordination was incident to the mer ger, that the 
changes should be implemented through the New York 
Dock procedures. The union ther e, like the USWA in the 
present case, countered that changes to the existing 
collective bargaining agreement could be made only 
through RLA procedures. The union br ought suit, claiming 
that a New York Dock arbitration of its dispute without its 
consent would violate its RLA rights. 
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that 
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. The court 
stated that the Supreme Court's Dispatchers  decision, while 
not directly on point, was determinative: 
 
       First of all, Dispatchers reiterates the proposition that 
       under the ICA, "the Interstate Commerce Commission 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
these differences, we explained, the judiciary "must reconcile the two 
statutes as much as possible and attempt to r each a result that will 
produce the minimum possible conflict with Congressional intent." Id. at 
423. But in invoking our decision in P&LE, the Union neglects to 
acknowledge that we were without the benefit of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Dispatchers. To the extent our observations on the 
relationship between the RLA and the ICA conflict with those of the 
Supreme Court in Dispatchers, ours must give way. 
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       [has] exclusive authority to examine, condition, and 
       approve proposed mergers and consolidations of 
       transportation carriers within its jurisdiction." Second, 
       Dispatchers makes clear that under Section [11321(a)], 
       the ICC has the effective power of exempting parties to 
       a railroad merger from any pr ovision of the RLA, by 
       approving the merger. It follows from these 
       propositions that where a railroad which has been a 
       party to an ICC approved merger claims that certain 
       proposed actions are incident to that mer ger and 
       exempt from RLA procedures under section [11321(a)], 
       the ICC has exclusive authority to resolve a challenge 
       to these claims. 
 
Southern Pacific, 7 F.3d at 906 (internal citations omitted). 
The court went on to state that the conclusion that 
jurisdiction belongs to the ICC and not the district court 
also comports with the policy objective underlying the ICA-- 
the promotion of economy and efficiency of interstate 
transportation. See Dispatchers, 499 U.S. at 132; Texas v. 
United States, 292 U.S. at 134. Integral to meeting this 
objective is the authority vested in the ICC to substitute 
RLA procedures with the expedited dispute resolution 
prescribed by the New York Dock conditions. But, if parties 
were allowed to litigate in federal district court the propriety 
of invoking the New York Dock pr ocess, the ICC's ability to 
meet this stated objective of facilitating rail consolidations 
would be hindered: "We would invite a barrage of collateral 
challenges to the ICC's authority which would be likely to 
frustrate and delay the administration of mer gers in a way 
that section [11321(a)] was clearly meant to avoid." Id. at 
907. 
 
The Fourth Circuit in Norfolk & W estern Ry. v. 
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, 164 F.3d 847 (4th Cir. 
1998) reached the same conclusion. As in Southern Pacific 
and the present case, the unions in Signalmen sought a 
declaratory judgement in district court that changes to 
collective bargaining agreements in connection with the 
implementation of a STB-authorized rail consolidation must 
be made pursuant to RLA procedures. The district court 
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The court of appeals found that the dismissal was pr oper. 
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Drawing on Dispatchers, the court held that within the 
context of an STB-authorized merger,"any effort to 
challenge changes in the collective bargaining agreements 
proposed . . . must be presented in thefirst instance to the 
STB under its exclusive jurisdiction and may not be 
negotiated under the RLA."9Id. at 855. 
 
The USWA argues that Dispatchers , Southern Pacific, and 
Signalmen are inapposite because the consolidations in 
those cases were authorized through the full approval 
process of S 11323 while the merger here was achieved 
through the abbreviated process ofS 10502. This 
distinction is critical, according to the USW A, because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Eleventh Circuit came to the same conclusion--although by way 
of a different rationale--in Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, Div. Of Transp. 
Comm. Int'l Union (TCU) v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 855 F.2d 745 (11th Cir. 
1988), a pre-Dispatchers case. Ther e, the ICC approved a merger of 
certain rail carriers and incident to that appr oval imposed the New York 
Dock conditions. The consolidated carrier then proposed to close down a 
repair shop and transfer the work and employees to another facility. 
Attempts between the carrier and the union r epresenting the affected 
employees to negotiate an implementing agreement on the transfer failed 
and the carrier sought arbitration of the dispute under New York Dock. 
The union in turn filed an action in district court arguing, inter alia, 
that 
the implementing agreement was not gover ned by the New York Dock 
procedures and that compulsory arbitration would violate the RLA. While 
the action in district court was pending, a New York Dock arbitrator 
considered the dispute and rendered a decision. Both parties appealed 
the arbitrator's decision to the ICC. Before the appeal was heard by the 
ICC, the district court granted summary judgment to the carrier. 
 
A panel of the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order, 
finding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the dispute. The court based its decision on Congress's grant 
of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to review ICC orders. 
28 
U.S.C. SS 2231(a), 2342(5). The court explained: "The arbitration opinion 
and award . . . is authoritative only as an extension of the authority of 
the ICC. . . . [T]he present lawsuit is, in effect, a collateral attack on 
the 
arbitration award; it is an attempt by [the union] to have the district 
court set aside the arbitration award, rather than going through the 
normal channels of appeal to the ICC and then to the Court of Appeals." 
Id. at 745. By assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, the court ruled, 
the district court improperly interfer ed with the normal appeals 
procedure and encroached on the court of appeals' exclusive authority to 
review ICC decisions. Id. 
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S 11321(a) exemption "from all other laws" applies only to 
S 11323 transactions. This argument is based on the 
language of S 11321(a), which provides that "[t]he authority 
of the Board under this subchapter is exclusive." (emphasis 
added). Section 10502 is not in the same subchapter as 
S 11321. See Railway Labor Executive Ass'n v. United 
States, 987 F.2d 806, 813 (D.C. Cir . 1993) ("That decision 
[Dispatchers] is not applicable her e, however, because 
S [11321(a)] applies to transactions exempted under 
subchapter III, of which it is a part. The Commission 
exempted the transaction at issue here underS [10502], 
which is in subchapter I"). The USWA ar gues, therefore, 
that when the STB is not given the power of making 
exemptions--that is, when its actions are not taken 
pursuant to S 11321(a)--there is no basis for granting 
exclusive jurisdiction to the STB. 
 
The USWA's argument misses the mark, confusing the 
STB's scope of exemption under S 11321(a) with its 
jurisdictional authority over disputes arising out of the 
implementation of railroad consolidations. Although 
S 11321(a) expressly can preempt the RLA, the STB's 
jurisdictional exclusivity does not depend alone on 
S 11321(a). Rather, the STB also finds jurisdictional 
authority in the overall statutory design of the ICA. 
Congress, in seeking to promote the economy and efficiency 
of the rail industry, has given the STB considerable 
authority over railroads, granting to it exclusive jurisdiction 
to authorize railroad mergers and consolidations. 49 U.S.C. 
S 11321(a). See Dispatchers, 499 U.S. at 119-20. 
 
Among the matters which the ICA puts within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the STB is the relationship between 
the railroad and its employees. Section 11324 mandates 
that the STB consider when approving a mer ger "the 
interest of the rail carrier employees af fected by the 
transaction." 49 U.S.C. S 11324(b)(4). Mor e importantly, 
S 11326 grants to the STB both the statutory authority and 
the mandate to impose on the rail carrier, as a condition of 
consolidation authorization, a "fair arrangement" that will 
protect the employees affected by the consolidation. All this 
demonstrates, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Signalmen, 
that "to the extent that a transaction subject to the STB's 
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approval impacts collective bargaining agreements or the 
relationship between railroads and their employees, the 
STB has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance to 
consider the issues." 164 F.3d at 855. Thus, the exclusive 
jurisdiction to resolve labor problems in a merger exists 
independently of the S 11321(a) exemption of such a merger 
from other laws.10 
 
The USWA contends, however, that interpreting the ICA 
as vesting the STB with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate 
all issues concerning railroad-employee r elationships which 
arise as a result of approved mergers is too sweeping. For 
this argument, it relies on the Seventh Circuit's decision in 
Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad, 141 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 
1998). There the court considered whether the ICA takes 
away from the district court jurisdiction to consider civil 
rights claims brought by two union members against a 
railroad carrier. The ICC had appr oved Union Pacific's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. To the extent that S 10502 mer gers may receive exclusive STB 
resolution of employee relations issues but not S 11321(a) exemption 
from "other laws," the justification for this result may be found in the 
fact that S 10502 mergers by definition are of "limited scope." 
 
That said, we note that the USWA's ef fort to draw a distinction 
between an approved transaction under S 11321(a) and an exempted 
transaction under S 10502 has been rejected by the ICC, which found 
that S 11321(a) does apply to S 10502 transactions. In Rio Grande 
Industries, Inc., et al. -- Trackage Rights-- Burlington Northern R.R. 
Lines Between Kansas City, MO and Chicago, IL, ICC Finance Docket No. 
31730, 1991 ICC LEXIS 57, served March 12, 1991, at *9-11, the ICC 
held that immunity under S 11321(a) extends to transactions exempted 
under S 10502. Accord Brother hood of Locomotive Engineers v. Boston & 
Maine Corp., 788 F.2d 794, 799-801 (1st Cir. 1986). 
 
The conclusion that S 11321(a) applies to both"approved" and 
"exempted" transactions is consistent with polices behind the Staggers 
Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980), which 
broadened and liberalized S 10502 in furtherance of the ICA's goal of 
revitalizing the railroad industry. See Coal Exporters Ass'n v. United 
States, 745 F.2d 76, 80-82 (D.C. Cir . 1984). By increasing the ICC's 
ability to exercise its power under S 10502, Congress indicated that the 
S 10502 procedure was an equal and even preferred way of regulating 
the railroad industry. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
105 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4110, 4137. 
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acquisition of another carrier pursuant to S 11321(a). 
Although the ICC imposed the New York Dock conditions, it 
also permitted labor and management to negotiate different 
conditions "in a labor agreement enter ed into prior to 
consolidation, in which case protection shall be at the 
negotiated level, subject to our review to assure fair and 
equitable treatment of affected employees." Id. at 741 
(quoting ICC order). The parties then r eached an alternative 
agreement for separation benefits. To qualify for the 
separation allowance, however, an employee on leave had to 
return to work within twenty days. Neither the union nor 
the management sought the ICC's review of the alternative 
agreement. 
 
The two plaintiffs in Harris wer e on maternity leave at the 
time the labor agreement was posted; neither r eturned 
within twenty days. Their applications for separation 
benefits were denied. They then filed suit for sex 
discrimination in district court. The court dismissed the 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh 
Circuit reversed, holding that the civil rights laws did not 
put any obstacle in the way of the railroad mer ger at issue. 
None of the relief sought by the plaintif fs would be 
incompatible with the ICC's approval of the mer ger. It 
would be pointless, therefore, to deny jurisdiction to the 
district court in order to refer the civil rights issue to the 
STB. 
 
The USWA urges us to follow Harris  by requiring that the 
STB articulate in its approval of a mer ger the laws that are 
necessary to displace. We do not read this result into 
Harris. We conclude that a case involving civil rights issues, 
arising from the application of a non-STB appr oved 
agreement to two members of a class, is distinguishable 
from the situation here where New York Dock arbitration 
has authorized changes in the labor agreement, which 
changes are necessary to implement the transaction. For 
that reason, even if we were bound to follow the Seventh 
Circuit, we would find Harris to be distinguishable.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In a related argument, the USW A contends that it cannot be made 
subject to the New York Dock pr ocedures because it was not a signatory 
to the Washington Job Protection Agr eement of 1936. On the USWA's 
 
                                17 
  
We conclude that the ICA--in its language and overall 
statutory design--reflects Congress's commitment to a 
national transportation policy that favors the consolidation 
of railroads. And Congress has decided that such a policy 
is best pursued by freeing rail consolidations from the 
burdensome delays and expenditures associated with RLA 
procedures. Thus, the ICA and the RLA ar e not 
complementary and co-equal statutory schemes, as the 
USWA proposes. The RLA must yield to the ICA when it 
impedes the implementation of a STB-approved 
consolidation. Moreover, the STB has the exclusive 
jurisdiction to adjudicate challenges to such an 
implementation. Accordingly, we will affir m the District 
Court's dismissal of the USWA's counter claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
B. The STB Decision 
 
We now turn to the USWA's petition for review of the STB 
decision of December 17, 1998. The standard the STB must 
apply in reviewing arbitration decisions is pr ovided in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
theory, only signatories to the Agreement have bargained away their RLA 
right to refuse to arbitration under New York Dock procedures. Wefind 
that this argument is without merit and agr ee with the District Court's 
conclusion that the ICC's authority S under 11326(a) to impose labor 
protections is "statutory in nature, and owe nothing to the WJPA." 
 
Although the WJPA provisions are, in many respects, duplicated in the 
New York Dock conditions, the two sets of labor protections derive their 
authority from different sour ces and are not equivalent in scope. The 
WJPA is a contract, the provisions of which bind only those carriers and 
unions that consented to the Agreement. The New York Dock conditions, 
on the other hand, arose as a result of Congressional mandate. As part 
of the Transportation Act of 1940, Congr ess granted to the ICC express 
statutory authority to impose employee protection upon approval of 
railroad mergers. Pub. L. No. 76-785, 54 Stat. 898 (1941) (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. SS 10101-11901 (1998)). It is pursuant to this 
statutory authority that the ICC developed the standard set of labor 
protections contained in New York Dock. The ICC's authority to impose 
the New York Dock conditions--and to make changes to labor 
agreements pursuant to those conditions--derives, therefore, from the 
ICA and reaches those carriers and unions who were not signatories to 
the WJPA. 
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Chicago & North Western Transportation Company, 3 I.C.C. 
2d 729 (1987) ("Lace Curtain"), af f 'd. sub. nom. 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. ICC, 862 
F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 49 CFR 1115.8. Under Lace 
Curtain, the arbitrator's decision is given deference and the 
STB will review "issues of causation, calculation of benefits, 
or the resolution of factual questions" only if there is 
egregious error. Review is thus limited to "recurring or 
otherwise significant issues of general importance regarding 
the interpretation of our labor conditions." 3 I.C.C. at 735- 
36. Based on this, the STB declined to review and vacate 
the Witt Award: "We find no reason to disturb the 
arbitrator's award under the Lace Curtain  standards. There 
is no issue of first impression; and any issues that are 
likely to recur have already been thor oughly resolved by us 
and the courts. [The USWA] has not shown egregious error 
or any other grounds requiring review of the arbitration 
award here." Union Railroad Company and Bessemer and 
Lake Erie Railroad -- Arbitration Review-- United Steel 
Workers of America, STB Finance Docket No. 31363 (Sub- 
No. 3), served Dec, 16, 1998, slip op. at 7-8. 
 
The USWA presents in this appeal no challenges to the 
factual determinations made by the arbitrator , relying solely 
on the argument it made before the District Court that the 
STB does not have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
USWA's RLA-based challenges to the implementation of the 
1988 ICC-authorized consolidation. In light of our analysis 
in the previous section, we cannot say that the Board's 
conclusion that it has exclusive jurisdiction to consider 
whether the ICA preempts the RLA was arbitrary, 
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. See 
National Small Shipments Traffic Confer ence, Inc. v. United 
States, 887 F.2d 443, 445 (1989). W e will, therefore, deny 
the petition for review of the STB's decision not to review 
the Witt Award. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the judgment of 
the District Court and we will deny the petition for review 
of the decision of the Surface Transportation Board. 
 
                                19 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                20 
 
